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As the byproduct of the speeded economic growth, pollution problem has been 
concerned by lots of nations all over the world. China is also facing the same serve 
environmental pollution. In some regions the circumstance seems to be out of 
control, which impedes economic growth and reduces individuals’ welfare level. The 
central government and lower levels of governments care for environmental 
protection to ensure harmonized development in economic and environmental 
systems. How do governments employ environmental policy to internalize the 
externality from pollution including the one from environmental competition 
between regions? The paper will extend the relative papers to analyze it.  
In Chapter one, based on some thoughts about different levels of governments 
in Gong and Zou (2002）and so on, I consider a generally competitive equilibrium 
and socially optimal outcome in an economy with two levels of governments under 
two different technologies of pollution abatement. It is shown that the efficiency of 
pollution control is the key cause of sustainable development. The competitive 
equilibrium reaches the socially optimal optimum with a sustainable growth, which 
is decided by the relative efficiency of pollution abatement and production 
technology. Hence, our nation as a developing country should improve the 
technology including the one of abating pollution, via which sustainable 
development is realized. 
In Chapter two, I consider the environmental externality from production 
activities in an overlapping model, analyzing capital dynamics with the competitive 
equilibrium and the comparative statics of each economic factor’s effect on the 
economy and environment at the steady state. It shows that more rigid environmental 
policy can bring more capital stock and better environmental quality in the steady 
state. The government should take a pollution tax to internalize the environmental 
externality, and otherwise need to design a tax scheme with consumption tax and a 
lump-sum transfer and so on to internalize the intergenerational externality for the 














Chapter three extends the models of Silva and Caplan (1997) and Heol and 
Shapiro (2003) to study the environmental policies of two levels of government for 
transboundary pollution with population mobility. I analyze the social efficiency of 
resource allocation in the mixed economy with the central and two local 
governments. The study shows that, whether the central government is the 
Stackelberg leader or the local governments are the Stackelberg leaders, the 
economy is able to achieve the social optimum by setting appropriate policy of 
income transfer. Especially, if the regional production technologies are different, the 
interregional income transfer is necessary for the social optimum.  
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进行支出，记中央政府花费为 f ，地方政府花费为 s 。中央政府和地方政府花
费类似于公共品以及私人消费 c一起进入效用函数，同时要考虑环境污染带来
的负效用，故消费者的效用函数为 ( , , , )U c f s P 。这里，假设代表性家庭只有一
个代表性消费者组成。消费者从中央政府和地方政府花费中获得递减的正边际
效用，而污染带来递减的负边际效用，即       
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